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We construct a dynamic voting model of multiparty competition in order
to capture the following facts: voters base their decision on past economic
performance of the parties, and parties and candidates have different objectives.
This model may explain the emergence of parties' ideologies, and shows the
compatibility of the different objectives of parties and candidates.  Together, these
results give rise to the formation of political parties, as infinitely-lived agents with
a certain ideology, out of the competition of myopic candidates freely choosing
policy positions.  We also show that in multicandidate elections held under the
plurality system, Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation is no longer
satisfied.1.  INTRODUCTION
Most of the literature on electoral competition focuses on the study of static
models.  Parties decide strategically which policy to advocate in order to win the
election.  Voters decide which party they like best and the model typically only
attempts to predict the elections' outcome.  While models of this type capture
some of the important features of party competition, they ignore some others.  In
reality, elections are repeated over time.  The dynamic nature of the process
changes both the circumstances under which elections are held and the voters'
preferences.  Finally, it introduces a distinction between a candidate and her party
as separate decision makers who may have different goals.  This paper presents a
simple model of three-party competition, focusing on these aspects.  For
simplicity and clarity of exposition we ignore many of the standard aspects of
party competition that are widely studied in the literature.
Since voters delegate the choice of a policy to parties, the choices available
to the voters are the parties.  The decision of the voters should be based on their
available information about parties.  In a dynamic setting, we consider past
performance of the parties while in office as the most reliable information that is
readily available to the voters.
We model the fact that in reality, voters often express dissatisfaction with
the parties.  Numerous studies of impression formation have found that negative
information is weighted more heavily than positive information as impressions of
others are formed.  This tendency is known as the negativity effect.  There are two
different explanations of the negativity effect in political behavior.  The perceptual
"figure-ground" theory proposes that the negativity effect occurs because negative
actions are contrasted against the generally positive expectations of presidential
candidates' behavior.  The "cost orientation" explanation argues that people are
risk oriented and motivated to avoid loss.  Several empirical studies have shown
the importance of the negativity effect in political behavior (Kernell (1977), Lau
(1982 and 1985), Klein (1991).  For a survey, see Aragones (1997)).
As in Aragones (1997), our model assumes that it is dissatisfaction, rather
than satisfaction that drives voters' choices; that is, voters vote against rather than
for parties.  Hence the record that voters keep of the parties reflects how much
they disliked them rather than how much they liked them, and this record is
updated every time that a new party takes office.  Further, voters' dissatisfaction
accumulates over time.  Formally, elections take place at periods t = 0,1,2,...
1Before each election voters update their evaluations of the parties by including the
results of last election, given by the last party in office (p
t) and the policy it chose
to implement (x
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Through this rule, the memory of past performance of the parties directly affects
the nature and "utility" of present experiences.  Therefore, even if voters know
how much they like or dislike a policy implemented by one of the parties at a
certain time, ui(x), this instantaneous utility function does not summarize all the
relevant information.  The function ui(×) should be thought of as some derivative
of the "real" utility, Ui(×), which in turn, is the aggregate of ui(×) values.  This
interpretation reflects the fact that the evaluation of parties by the voters is
constantly changing over time as new parties are taking office.  Since, as we have
argued, voters get more tired of parties the longer they are in power, we define
ui(×) as the negative of the distance between the voter’s ideal point and the policy
chosen by the party.
Since elections take place over time, we have to deal with the fact that
candidates and parties have different "life" horizon.  While candidates typically
cannot be reelected forever, parties can.  Thus it is natural to make a distinction
between candidates and parties with respect to their objective functions.  Since
candidates cannot be reelected over and over again, they behave myopically.  It is
assumed that the objective of the candidates while in office is to maximize the
proportion of votes that their party will get in next election1.  Parties, on the other
hand, care about the future and they try to maximize the number of times they
will be in office over time.  Candidates may be viewed as players in a one period
game, whereas parties – as players in an infinite period one.  We will see that the
different objectives of parties and candidates are compatible.  Furthermore, the
choices that candidates make while in office result in the formation of different
ideologies for different parties.
For simplicity we assume that the choices of parties and candidates are
given by the set  0,1 { }.  It may be interpreted as follows: given a position of the
economic variables, the performance of a party in office for one period can decide
1  Since in this model voters base their decision on parties' past performance, the only
relevant decision of parties and candidates is the policy they implement after they have been
elected. Platforms do not have any effect on the voters' choice and therefore are omitted.
2the direction in which the economy is going to move but cannot position the
economy in a point of the state space far away from the original one (status quo).
Grofman (1985) analyzes the relationship of this policy space with the standard
one.  As an example, policies of type 0 can be thought of as "to cut taxes" or
"protectionist policies" or "decrease public expenditure" and policies of type 1 as
"to raise taxes" or "nonprotectionist policies" or "increase public expenditure"
respectively.  The model can also apply to any other kind of policy, for instance,
to increase or decrease aid to fledgling democracies.
The properties that characterize the electoral system in the present model
are the following: each voter has a single vote to cast and there is a single-winner
elected under plurality rule.  Given the decision rule of the voters we have sincere
voting and, because our voters do not consider the possibility of abstention, all
votes are to be cast.  There is a continuum of voters with "ideal points" uniformly
distributed on the interval  0,1 [ ]. (An "ideal point" reflects a voter's preferences fro
the frequency with which policy 1 is implemented.)  The number of parties is
exogenous and the main results are given for a three party competition.  Parties
do not have ideal points to begin with.  These are endogenously determined by
maximizing their objective functions.  Each party presents one candidate for each
election.  Therefore there is no need for platforms: voters make their decision
based on past performance alone.  The winner of the election has to choose a
policy to implement in the set  0,1 { }.  Since candidates cannot be reelected forever,
they maximize the proportion of votes stagewise.  Parties, on the other hand, care
about the future and maximize the limit frequencies of the number of times they
win.
Aragones (1997) studies a similar model with two party competition.  It
shows that parties that only try to maximize the number of votes at each election,
behave as if they had ideal points in the policy space (ideologies).  In the present
paper we focus on three party competition2  for three reasons: first, to test the
robustness of these results; second, to study the relationship between the policy
space and the number of different "ideologies" that may emerge; and lastly, to
study the effect of a party splitting into two formally distinct parties.
2  Although most of the literature on party competition focuses on the two-party case, in
modern democracies there are many examples of multiparty competition.  In Canada, two major
parties together typically receive more than three quarters of the votes and a third party receives
most of the remainder.  India has a multiparty system with a dominant party.  Even in the United
States, the presence of a third party often interrupts the usual competition between Democrats and
Republicans.
3Equilibrium analysis for three-party competition yields the following
predictions: the status quo (aggregate of policies implemented over time)
converges to the median voter's ideal point and the policies chosen by the
candidates characterize the ideology of the party to which they belong.  The
results for the two-party case should become clear from this derivation.  In the
concluding remarks we also suggest some conjectures about the results of
competition among a larger number of parties.
First we present a solution of the candidates competition that relies on the
assumption that candidates are loyal in the following sense: when they are
indifferent between policies of type 0 and 1 they will choose the policy that the
party has chosen in the past (this will turn out to be well defined).  In this case the
solution shows that no party mixes policies of different types, i.e., if a party starts
choosing a policy of type 1 it will continue choosing this type of policy for ever
(Theorem 1).  Then we drop the assumption of loyalty and in the long run we
have a similar result (Theorem 2), i.e., in the first periods one of the parties may
switch between the two types of policies but at some point it chooses one of them
and continues with the chosen one for ever.  In both cases, it is in the interest of
each party to have no other party choosing the same type of policy it has decided
to implement.  The two solutions described above yield the same results for the
long run: one of the parties chooses one type of policy and wins one half of the
time and the other two parties choose policies of the other type and each wins one
fourth of the time.  Since we assume that parties have no ideal point to begin with,
this result can be interpreted as suggesting that ideologies may emerge from the
actions of the candidates when maximizing the popularity of the party in the
short run.
This result is corroborated by evidence.  Empirical studies lend support to
the claim that Democrats and Republicans have different effects on the economy
while in office.  Hibbs (1977), Beck (1982), and Chappel and Keech (1986) show
the different effect on the unemployment rate.  Alesina and Sachs (1988) and
Tabellini and La Via (1989) show that republican administrations have been
associated with tighter monetary policies.  Frey and Schneider (1978) found that
conservative presidents tend to restrict expenditures.  The point we would like to
emphasize is that these ideologies need not be assumed as primitive; they may
simply result from the parties' attempt to differentiate themselves from others.
Thus, the three party model suggests the following conclusions.  First, the
emergence of ideologies is not an artifact of  the two party model.  Second, the
number of "ideologies" seems to depend on the policy space, rather than on the
4number of parties; despite the parties incentive to differentiate themselves from
each other, no party in our model chooses to appear as "moderate," and they all
choose some "extreme."  Finally, our results seem to explain Duverger Law: when
the policy space consists of only two points, there is "no room" for a third party.
In the solutions described above we have considered candidates as the
players of the game at each stage.  If parties instead of candidates were to decide
on policies, their objective would be to maximize the number of times that the
party wins, i.e., they would take into account that they are going to participate in
all elections and so they would prefer to sacrifice some of the votes in a given
period in order to increase the total number of times in office.  We show that if
candidates are stagewise vote-maximizers and loyal, their choices constitute a
Nash equilibrium path in the infinite-stage game.   In the model we present we
have that even in the case that candidates were completely responsible for the
choice of policies, their choices would not conflict with their parties' long-run
objectives.  Furthermore, the resulting choice of policies over time characterizes
the party by what we have called emergence of ideologies: in equilibrium parties
are identified with a certain type of policy.   Thus, the competition of myopic
candidates that behave independently of the party label assigned to them gives as
a result the characterization of political parties by an ideology.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 relates the present
model to the existing literature.  Section 3 describes formally the model.  In
section 4 we present the results.  Section 5 includes some concluding remarks.
2.  RELATED LITERATURE.
There exist some theories of voting which suggest that voters base their
decision on past performance of the parties.  The Reward-Punishment theory
proposed by Key (1966) is based on the assumption that voters only care about
the effects of the policies that parties choose and they are looking at past
performance when deciding how much confidence to give to each party.  Downs
(1957) proposed a theory according to which parties' past performance is the
cheapest way for voters to predict future performance.  In this model, voters care
about the policy that a party implements on top of its effects.  He assumes that
political parties must be consistent over time in the policies they advocate and
implement.  Our interpretation of the voters' behavior is different from Downs'
but we find that consistency over time in the policies implemented is a result of
5optimal choice of the parties.  Fiorina (1981) builds a dynamic model for two
parties that combines features of both theories and examines it at the empirical
level.  He assumes that voters base their decision not only on past performance of
the parties but also on past promises and hypothetical choices of policies.  He
shows that most of the assumptions of his theory are supported by the data.  Our
model is much simpler than Fiorina's.  Past promises or hypothetical choices are
not considered by the voters in their evaluation of the parties.  For simplicity we
also assume that platforms have no effect on the evaluation of the parties.
Other variations of retrospective voting have been suggested in analyzing
how voters ought to behave if they wish to get their representatives to pursue
their interests.  The solution is an optimal decision rule for the voters given that
they know the objective function of the parties.  Ferejohn (1986) and Austen-Smith
and Banks (1989) are two examples.  In our model, we assume that voters use
very little information to make their decision.  They do not know the objectives
that define parties' behavior and they use a very simple rule to evaluate parties
based on past performance.  Even though the decision rule of the voters uses all
the information in the voters' memory about past performance of the parties, at
each point of time a voter only has to remember one number for each party,
which represents the evaluation of the party by the voter.  After he has seen the
performance of a party while in office, the voter updates his evaluation of this
party by adding a number to his previous evaluation.
Kramer (1977) presents a dynamic model of two-party competition whose
main assumptions are the following: parties maximize votes myopically; the
preferences of the voters are constant over time and are defined on the policy
space; at any time the challenger can choose any policy in the policy space while
the incumbent must defend the same policy.  One of his results is that the
challenger always has a strategy that defeats the incumbent, therefore parties
alternate in office.  Without restricting the actions of the party in office our model
also shows that most of the time the challengers can defeat the party in office.
3.  THE MODEL
We assume there is a continuum of voters.  Each voter is characterized by
his ideal point and they are distributed uniformly on the interval  0,1 [ ].  Their
instantaneous utility functions are single peaked: ui(x) = - xi - x  where xi
represents the ideal point of voter i.  It can be interpreted as follows: if voter i
6were a dictator, he would choose policy 1 a proportion xi of the times and policy
0 a proportion  1- xi ( ) of the times.
At each time t = 0,1,2,... an election takes place.  At time t all voters have
memory   M
t ( )i = M
t of past elections.  An element of memory, which we call a
case, is represented by m
t = t,p
t,x
t ( ) where p
t represents the party that won the
election at time t and  x
t  the type of policy it implemented.  The memory of voters




t ( ) { } and M
0 =Æ.  For voter i at time T, each
party  p is ranked by aggregation of all cases in the memory M
T
 in which p won
the election, i.e., m
t = t,p
t,x
t ( ) ÎM
T  such that p
t = p for t < T and it is given by3 :
Ui
T p ( )= ui x
t ( )
t,p,xt ( )ÎMT å
When there are no cases in memory to calculate the utility, its default value is
zero.  Voters give their vote to the party that gives them the highest utility level
(i.e., they do not vote strategically).  If a voter is indifferent among different
parties, he will choose each of them with equal probability.  We will assume that
the law of large numbers holds, i.e., that if a proportion   of voters are indifferent
among parties in a set Po , each party in Po  gets a proportion 
Po
 of the votes4 .
At each time t the party that obtains the largest proportion of votes wins
the election and has to choose a policy to implement.  Formally, let  p
t  be the
proportion of votes for party  p at time t; party  p* wins election t only if  p*
t ³ p
t
for all p Î a,b,c { }.  Ties are broken by fair lotteries.  The policies are  0,1 { } to be
interpreted as a small change in one of the two possible directions.  Let k1
p t ( ) be
the number of times that party  p was in power and chose policy 1 up to time t.
Similarly, we define k0
p t ( ) and k
p t ( ) = k0
p t ( )+ k1
p t ( ).  Thus, for every t,
t = k0
a t ( )+ k1
a t ( )+ k0
b t ( )+ k1
b t ( ) + k0
c t ( )+ k1
c t ( ).
It will simplify notation to define the infinite period game for the parties and
embed the candidates' game in it.  That is, instead of defining the candidates'
game as a game with infinitely many stagewise vote-maximizer players we will
model them as agents of the parties, and reflect their utility maximization by an
appropriate choice of strategies for the parties.
3  Notice that this decision rule is equivalent to the one presented in the introduction.  It has
been suggested by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993).
4   See Judd (1985)  for the mathematical subtleties involved.
7Let us formally define the parties game to be the following infinite-stage
game.  The set of players is  a,b,c { }.  For every t ³ 0 nature chooses a "winner"
from  a,b,c { } as follows: if there exists a party p such that  p
t > p'
t  for all p'¹ p
then p is the winner with probability one.  Otherwise, nature chooses one of the
maximizers of  p
t  with equal probability.  Then, for the same t ³ 0, the winner
chooses an element of  0,1 { }, Ui
t p ( ) is updated and the game proceeds to stage





 be the set of histories of the game at time t and let h
t
denote an
element of this set.  That is, h
t
 is a sequence of t elements of the set
H = p,x ( ):p Î a,b,c { }and x Î 0,1 { } { }.




t ( ) where p
t is the party that
wins election t and  x
t
 is the policy it implements (h
0
 is the empty sequence).  The
proportion of votes for party  p at time t is a function of the history of the game at
time t, formally  p
t :H
t ® 0,1 [ ].
A strategy for party p is defined by x
p = x0,x1,x2,..., xt,... ( ) where
xt:H
t ® 0,1 { } is a function that assigns to each history a policy x Î 0,1 { }.  We
consider the following two sets of strategies: the set of vote maximizing strategies
X
p = x0,x1,x2,..., xt,... ( ): p
t+1 h
t p,xt h
t ( ) ( ) ( ) ³ p
t+1 h
t p,x ( ) ( ) forall x Î 0,1 { }andall t ³ 0 { }
and its subset of loyal strategies
XL
p = x0,x1,x2,..., xt,... ( )ÎX
p:
xt h
t ( ) = x if p
t+1 h
t p,0 ( ) ( ) = p
t+1 h
t p,1 ( ) ( )
andx j h









First, we analyze the behavior of the candidates as autonomous agents in
the game.  At each election t we have a different candidate for each party.  The
candidate of the winning party has to choose a policy.  We assume that at each
time t, the candidate that wins the election, implicitly assumed to know the
decision rule of the voters, chooses a policy in the set  0,1 { } to maximize the
proportion of votes that she can obtain in the next election (stagewise vote-
8maximizer).  In addition, we have an assumption of loyalty: if a candidate is
indifferent between the two policies (in terms of vote maximization) and if all
previous candidates of her party happened to have chosen the same policy, so
will she.  (Notice that this assumption does not restrict a candidate choice if she is
the first to win on her party's behalf or if past winners happened to choose
different policies.) These agents' preferences are equivalent to assuming that the
party chooses a strategy x
p
 in the set XL
p
.
Theorem 1: Competition of loyal candidates.
If for all p ÎP, x
p ÎXL
p  we have the following results up to any permutation of
parties and/or of policies:
I. For all t = 4k, k =1,2,...
(i) k0
a t ( ) =k
a t ( )= k, k0
b t ( ) =k
b t ( )= k and k1
c t ( ) = k
c t ( )= 2k
ii ( ) Foralli, Ui
t a ( ) = -kxi,Ui
t b ( ) = -kxi and Ui
t c ( ) =-2k 1-x i ( )
II.lim t®¥
k














(All proofs are relegated to an appendix.)
Part I of the theorem states that, under the above assumptions, parties will
always choose the same type of policy.  In this case, we have that for all t = 4k
parties a and b, which have been choosing policies of type 0, win one fourth of
the time and party c, which has been choosing policies of type 1, wins one half of
the time.
Part II concludes that in the long run the limit frequencies of the time in
office for the parties are as follows: party c, who has been choosing only policies
of type 1, wins one half of the time and parties a and b, who have chosen only
policies of type 0, win one fourth of the time each.
Next we drop the loyalty assumption.  We still assume that at each time t,
the candidate that wins the election, implicitly assumed to know the decision rule
of the voters, chooses a policy in the set  0,1 { } to maximize the proportion of votes
that she can obtain in the next election (stagewise vote-maximizer).  Formally, the




9Theorem 2: Competition of candidates.
If for all p ÎP, x
p ÎX
p  then we have the following results up to any permutation
of parties and/or of policies:
I. For all t = 4k, k =1,2,...thereexist k1 and k2 withk = k1 + k2 and min k1,k2 { }£ 3 such that:
i ( )k0
a t ( )= k1,k1
a t ( ) = k2,k0
b t ( )= k
b t ( ) = k1 + 2k2 and k1
c t ( ) = k
c t ( ) = 2k1 + k2
ii ( ) For all i,Ui
t a ( ) = -k1xi - k2 1- xi ( ),
Ui
t b ( ) =- k 1+2k2 ( )xi and
Ui
t a ( ) =- 2k 1+k 2 ( )1-xi ( )
II. limt®¥
k
















Furthermore, for all p Î a,b,c { },if k0
p t ( )> 0 and k1
p t ( ) > 0 for some t, thenlim t®¥
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Theorem 2 states that two of the parties will always choose the same type
of policy, regardless of how the third party chooses to mix the policies.  That is,
two of the parties are behaving as if they were loyal, while the third one is
"almost" loyal: it will choose the same policy whenever in power, except for at
most three times.
In the long run the limit frequencies of the periods in which the parties are
in office are as follows: If party a, who started mixing, ends up choosing a policy
of type 0, then party c, who has been choosing only policies of type 1 will win one
half of the time and parties a and b, who have chosen mostly policies of type 0
will win one fourth of the time each.  If party a ends up choosing a policy of type
1 then party b, who has been choosing only policies of type 0 will win one half of
the time and parties a and c, who have chosen mostly policies of type 1, will win
one fourth of the time each.  At any rate, the long-run frequencies are as specified
in Theorem 1; however, in case one party mixes the two types of policies, it cannot
be the one that wins one half of the times.
Finally, we consider the case of competition of parties.  As explained in the
introduction, stagewise maximization characterizes the objective of the
candidates.  Since candidates cannot be reelected, they only care about their
popularity one period ahead.  In contrast, parties participate in elections at all
periods.  Therefore the objective of the parties can be characterized by the
maximization of the limit frequency of the number of times that the party is in
power.  If candidates are stagewise vote-maximizers and loyal, as assumed in the
10first solution, we also have that their choices constitute a Nash equilibrium path
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t
 where k
p t ( ) is the number of times that party p has been in
office up to time t.
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c ( ) need not be a Nash equilibrium
of the parties game.  (A counterexample is provided in the appendix.)
5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
1.  We start by assuming that all parties are identical, that they do not have
preferences over policies; rather, they are vote maximizers.  In equilibrium parties
and candidates behave as if they had ideal points, i.e., each party chooses always
the same policy.  If, instead, we assume that parties have non-identical
preferences over policies and their objective is not only to win elections but also to
implement their most preferred policies, one can show that the result will not
change.  Therefore, the fact that parties always choose the same policy is
compatible with (at least) two theories: (i) the parties are only interested in vote
maximization, and ideologies "emerge" from strategic considerations; and (ii)
parties do have ideologies to begin with, and these determine their initial choices,
since vote maximization leaves them indifferent between the two policies;
however, in later stages vote maximization and ideological considerations
coincide.
2.  The two solutions described in the paper for the "candidates' game"
show the same results for the long run: one of the parties chooses one type of
policy and wins one half of the time and the other two parties choose policies of
the other type and each wins one fourth of the time.  By comparison, consider the
11two-party case in our model.  It is easy to see that as a result of two-party
competition none of the parties can win more than one half of the times in the
limit.  Hence our results may also be interpreted as if there were "no room" for a
third party.  That is, if we start with two parties, none of them seems to gain
anything by dividing into two different parties.  On the other hand, if we start
with three parties, the two of them that end up choosing the same type of policy
have no incentive to form a coalition, since by appearing as a single party they can
only win one half of the times which is exactly what they do in aggregate.  Notice
that, as in Palfrey (1984), the presence of a third party is what drives the
uniqueness of the strategies chosen by the parties.  We conjecture that for
competition of a larger number of parties, similar results should hold, that is,
candidates whose sole objective is to win the election will not have any incentive
to deviate from the ideology that characterizes the party they belong to.
3.  If we define the economic configuration or status quo at time t, e
t
, as
the ratio between the number of times that type 1 policies have been chosen in the
past and the total number of elections we find that, in both cases, the economic
configuration tends to stabilize at one half, that is, in the limit both policies have
been chosen the same number of times.  This result reflects the fact that parties
tend to satisfy the median voter in some sense.  To be precise, on the aggregate
level there is some support to Hotelling's result.  On the other hand, if we
consider the aggregate economic variable when each party is in power, it tends to
one half for all parties.  However, this is a result of aggregation over time, taking
into account the cumulative effect of past elections.  By contrast, when we focus
on each party's decision variable, i.e., whether to lead the economy to the "left" or
"right" end of the state space we find the opposite of Hotelling's result of
minimum differentiation, i.e., that parties are pushed to one of the extreme
policies ("always right" or "always left").  Notice that the economic configuration
is only a measure of the aggregate effects of the policies implemented and has no
strategic implications.
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14APPENDIX
To simplify notation we will write  p
t x ( ) and  p
t
 instead of  p
t h




Proof of Theorem 1:
Part I: first we prove  ii ( ) by induction on k :
At t = 0, we have Ui
0 a ( ) = Ui
0 b ( )= Ui




 for all  p which implies a tie
among the three parties. If party a wins the first election  a
1 0 ( ) = a
1 1 ( )= 0 , i.e., party a is
indifferent between policies 0 and 1.
At t = 1, if  p
0,x
0 ( ) = a,0 ( ) then Ui
1 a ( )= -xi  and Ui
1 b ( )= Ui
1 c ( )= 0 . Therefore  a






 implies a tie between parties b and c. If party b wins the second election
b
2 0 ( ) = b
2 1 ( ) = 0 , i.e., party b is indifferent between policies 0 and 1.
At t = 2, if  p
0,x
0 ( ) = a,0 ( ) and  p
1,x
1 ( ) = b,0 ( ) then Ui
2 a ( ) = Ui
2 b ( )= -xi  and Ui
2 c ( ) = 0 .
Therefore  a
2 = b
2 = 0  and  c
2 = 1 implies that party c wins the third election and
c







3 1 ( ) , i.e., party c chooses policy 1.
At t = 3, given that  p
0,x
0 ( ) = a,0 ( ), p
1,x
1 ( )= b,0 ( )  and  p
2,x
2 ( ) = c,1 ( ), we have
Ui
3 a ( ) = Ui
3 b ( ) =-x i and Ui










party c wins the fourth election and  c




4 1 ( ) , i.e., party c chooses policy 1.
In addition to  a,0 ( ), b,0 ( ), c,1 ( ), c,1 ( ) [ ], other possible results for this period are:
a,0 ( ), b,1 ( ), c,0 ( ), b,1 ( ) [ ] and  a,0 ( ), b,1 ( ), c,1 ( ), a,0 ( ) [ ] up to any permutation of parties or
policies. At t = 4,i.e. k =1, for all possible results we have Ui
4 a ( ) = Ui
4 b ( ) =-x i and
Ui
4 c ( ) = -2 1- xi ( ) up to any permutation of parties or policies.
Now, suppose that the result is true for k >1. Then, at t = 4k  we have Ui
4 k a ( ) = Ui
4k b ( ) = -kxi
and Ui




 for all  p, i.e., a tie among the three parties.
Here we have two cases depending on who breaks the tie.
Case 1.- If party a (or b) wins the election at time t = 4k  we have  a
4k+1 0 ( )= a
4k+1 1 ( )= 0 .
Thus, party a will choose policy 0, because it is the policy it has already chosen in the past.
At t = 4k +1 we have:
15Ui
4 k+1 a ( )= - k +1 ( )xi,Ui
4k+1 b ( ) =-kxi  and Ui
4 k+1 c ( ) =-2k 1-x i ( ).
Therefore  a








 which implies that party b wins this election and
b







4k+2 1 ( ), i.e., party b chooses policy 0.
At t = 4k + 2 we have:
Ui
4 k+2 a ( ) = Ui
4 k+2 b ( )= - k +1 ( )xi  and Ui










4k+2 which implies that party c wins this election
and  c







4k+3 1 ( ), i.e., party c chooses policy 1.
At t = 4k + 3 we have:
Ui
4 k+3 a ( ) = Ui
4k+3 b ( ) =- k+1 ( )xi and Ui










4 k+3 which implies that party c wins this
election and  c







4 k+4 1 ( ), i.e., party c chooses policy 1.
At t = 4 k +1 ( ) we have: Ui
4 k +1 ( ) a ( ) = Ui
4 k+1 ( ) b ( ) = - k +1 ( )xi  and
Ui
4 k +1 ( ) c ( ) = -2 k +1 ( ) 1- xi ( ).
Case 2.- If party c wins the election at time t = 4k  we have:
c







4k +1 1 ( ) ,
i.e., party c will choose policy 1.
At t = 4k +1 we have:
Ui
4 k+1 a ( )= Ui
4 k+1 b ( ) = -kxi  and Ui










 which implies that party a (or b) wins
this election and  a
4k+2 0 ( ) = a
4k+2 1 ( ) = 0 . Thus, party a chooses policy 0 because it is the policy
it has already chosen in the past.
At t = 4k + 2 we have:
Ui
4 k+2 a ( ) =- k+1 ( )xi,Ui
4k+2 b ( )=-kxi and Ui
4 k+2 c ( ) =- 2k+1 ( )1-xi ( ).
16Therefore  a









  which implies that party b wins this
election and  b







4k+3 1 ( ), i.e., party b chooses policy 0.
At t = 4k + 3 we have:
Ui
4 k+3 a ( ) = Ui
4k+3 b ( ) =- k+1 ( )xi and Ui










4 k+3 which implies that party c wins this
election and  c







4 k+4 1 ( ), i.e., party c chooses policy 1.
At t = 4 k +1 ( ) we have:
Ui
4 k +1 ( ) a ( ) = Ui
4 k+1 ( ) b ( ) = - k +1 ( )xi  and Ui
4 k +1 ( ) c ( ) = -2 k +1 ( ) 1- xi ( ).
i ( ) follows directly from  ii ( ). Part II follows from part I.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Part I: first we prove  ii ( ) by induction on k . Assume that at t = 4k  we have k1 = k and k2 = 0 .
Then Ui
4 k a ( ) = Ui
4k b ( ) = -kxi and Ui
4 k c ( ) = -2k 1- xi ( ). Furthermore, suppose that party a
wins the election at t = 4k  and chooses policy 1. (If party a chooses policy 0, at t = 4 k +1 ( ) we
have k1 = k +1 and k2 = 0 , from the previous proof.)
At t = 4k +1 we have:
Ui
4 k+1 a ( )= -kxi - 1- xi ( ),Ui
4k+1 b ( ) = -kxi and Ui
4 k+1 c ( ) =-2k 1-x i ( ).
Therefore  a








 which implies that party b wins this election and
b







4 k+2 1 ( ), i.e., party b chooses policy 0.
At t = 4k + 2 we have:
Ui
4 k+2 a ( ) =-kxi - 1- xi ( ),Ui
4k +2 b ( ) = - k +1 ( )xi  and Ui













 which implies that party b wins this
election and  b
4k+3 0 ( ) =
1
3
> 0 = b
4k+3 1 ( ) , i.e., party b chooses policy 0.
At t = 4k + 3 we have:
17Ui
4 k+3 a ( ) = -kxi - 1- xi ( ),Ui
4k+3 b ( )= - k + 2 ( )xi  and Ui













 which implies that party c wins this
election and  c







4 k+4 1 ( ), i.e., party c chooses policy 1.
At t = 4 k +1 ( ) we have:
Ui
4 k +1 ( ) a ( ) = -kxi - 1- xi ( ),Ui
4 k+1 ( ) b ( ) = - k + 2 ( )xi  and Ui
4 k+4 c ( ) = - 2k +1 ( ) 1- xi ( )
Now suppose that at t = 4k  party c has won the election. From the previous proof we know that
it chooses policy 1.
At t = 4k +1 we have:
Ui
4 k+1 a ( )= Ui
4 k+1 b ( ) = -kxi  and Ui










 which implies that party a (or b) wins
this election and  a
4k+2 0 ( ) = a
4k+2 1 ( ) = 0 . Suppose party a chooses policy 1. (The case in which
party a chooses policy 0 is analized in the previous proof.)
At t = 4k + 2 we have:
Ui
4 k+2 a ( ) =-kxi - 1- xi ( ),Ui
4k +2 b ( ) = -kxi  and Ui
4 k+2 c ( ) =- 2k+1 ( )1-xi ( ).
Therefore  a









 which implies that party b wins this
election and  b







4k+3 1 ( ) , i.e., party b chooses policy 0.
At t = 4k + 3 we have:
Ui
4 k+3 a ( ) = -kxi - 1- xi ( ),Ui
4k+3 b ( )= - k +1 ( )xi  and Ui













 which implies that party b wins this election
and  b
4k+4 0 ( ) =
1
3
> 0 = b
4k+4 1 ( ) , i.e., party b chooses policy 0.
At t = 4 k +1 ( ) we have:
Ui
4 k +1 ( ) a ( ) = -kxi - 1- xi ( ),Ui
4 k+1 ( ) b ( ) = - k + 2 ( )xi  and Ui
4 k+4 c ( ) = - 2k +1 ( ) 1- xi ( )
which proves the result for k1 = k and k2 = 1. Similarly it can be proven for k1 = 1 and k2 = k.
Now suppose that it is true for k1 >1 and k2 > 1 and k1 + k2 = k.
18At t = 4k  we have:
Ui
4 k a ( ) = -k1xi - k2 1- xi ( ),Ui
4k b ( )= - k1 + 2k2 ( )xi and Ui
4 k c ( ) = - 2k1 + k2 ( ) 1- xi ( ).
Case 1.- Suppose that party a wins the election at t = 4k . Then
a
4k+1 0 ( )=
3k1k2 - 2k1 - k2
3k1 +1 ( ) 3k2 -1 ( )
, a
4k+1 1 ( ) =
3k1k2 - k1 - 2k2
3k1 - 1 ( ) 3k2 +1 ( )
,
a
4k+1 0 ( )> a



















4k+1 0 ( )< a



















4k+1 0 ( )= a
4k+1 1 ( )iff k1 = k2
Case 1.1.- If at t = 4k  party a chooses policy 0. Then at t = 4k +1 we have:
Ui
4 k+1 a ( )= - k1 +1 ( )xi - k2 1- xi ( ),Ui
4k+1 b ( )= - k1 + 2k2 ( )xi and
Ui
4 k+1 c ( ) =- 2k 1+k2 ( )1-x i ( ).
Therefore  a
4k+1 =
3k1k2 - 2k1 - k2

















 Case 1.1.1.- If at t = 4k +1 party b wins then  b







4k +2 1 ( ) , i.e., party b
chooses policy 0.
At t = 4k + 2 we have:
Ui
4 k+2 a ( ) =- k 1+1 ( )x i -k2 1-x i ( ) ,U i
4k+2 b ( )=- k 1+2k 2+1 ( )xi and
Ui













 which implies that party c wins this
election and  c







4k+3 1 ( ) i.e., party c chooses policy 1.
At t = 4k + 3 we have:
Ui
4 k+3 a ( ) = - k1 + 1 ( )xi - k2 1- xi ( ),Ui
4 k+3 b ( ) = - k1 + 2k2 +1 ( )xi  and
Ui













 which implies that party c wins this
election and  c







4k +4 1 ( ), i.e., party c chooses policy 1.
 Case 1.1.2.- If at t = 4k +1 party c wins then  c







4k +2 1 ( ) , i.e., party c
chooses policy 1.
At t = 4k + 2 we have:
Ui
4 k+2 a ( ) =- k 1+1 ( )x i -k2 1-x i ( ) ,U i
4k+2 b ( )=- k 1+2k 2 ( )xi and
Ui
4 k+2 c ( ) =- 2k 1+k 2+1 ( )1-x i ( )
Therefore  a
4k+2 =
3k1k2 - 2k1 + k2 -1













4k +2 iff k2 £ k1 +1.
 Case 1.1.2.1.- If at t = 4k + 2 party b wins then  b







4k+3 1 ( ), i.e., party b
chooses policy 0.
At t = 4k + 3 we have:
Ui
4 k+3 a ( ) = - k1 + 1 ( )xi - k2 1- xi ( ),Ui
4 k+3 b ( ) = - k1 + 2k2 +1 ( )xi  and
Ui













 which implies that party c wins this
election and  c







4 k+4 1 ( ), i.e., party c chooses policy 1.
 Case 1.1.2.2.- If at t = 4k + 2 party c wins then  c







4k+3 1 ( ), i.e., party c
chooses policy 1.
At t = 4k + 3 we have:
Ui
4 k+3 a ( ) = - k1 + 1 ( )xi - k2 1- xi ( ),Ui
4k+3 b ( )= - k1 + 2k2 ( )xi, and
Ui













 which implies that party b wins this
election and  b







4 k+4 1 ( ), i.e., party b chooses policy 0.
20At t = 4 k +1 ( ), for all possible results of Case 1.1. we have:
Ui
4 k +1 ( ) a ( ) = - k1 +1 ( )xi - k2 1- xi ( ),Ui
4 k+1 ( ) b ( ) = - k1 +1 ( )+ 2k2 ( )xi  and
Ui
4 k +1 ( ) c ( ) = - 2 k1 +1 ( )+ k2 ( ) 1- xi ( ).
Case 1.2.- If at t = 4k  party a chooses policy 1 then at t = 4k +1 we have:
Ui
4 k+1 a ( )= -k1xi - k2 +1 ( ) 1- xi ( ),Ui
4k+1 b ( ) = - k1 + 2k2 ( )xi  and
Ui
4 k+1 c ( ) =- 2k 1+k2 ( )1-x i ( ).
Therefore  a
4k+1 =
3k1k2 - k1 - 2k2

















By a similar argument we can prove that at t = 4 k +1 ( ) we have:
Ui
4 k +1 ( ) a ( ) = -k1xi - k2 + 1 ( ) 1- xi ( ),Ui
4 k+1 ( ) b ( ) = - k1 + 2 k2 +1 ( ) ( )xi  and
Ui
4 k +1 ( ) c ( ) = - 2k1 + k2 + 1 ( ) ( ) 1- xi ( ).
Case 2.- Suppose that party b wins the election. Then  b







4k +1 1 ( ) ,
i.e., party b chooses policy 0.
At t = 4k +1 we have:
Ui
4 k+1 a ( )= -k1xi - k2 1- xi ( ),Ui
4 k+1 b ( )= - k1 + 2k2 +1 ( )xi  and Ui













 which implies that party a wins
a




4k +2 1 ( ) =
3k1k2 + k1 - 2k2 -1
3k1 -1 ( ) 3k2 +1 ( )
 and
a
4k+2 0 ( )³ a
4k +2 1 ( )iff k2 £
9 k1 ( )
2 - 6k1 + 5
9k1 - 9
.
Case 2.1.- If at t = 4k +1 party a chooses policy 0 then at t = 4k + 2 we have:
Ui
4 k+2 a ( ) =- k 1+1 ( )x i -k2 1-x i ( ) ,Ui
4k+2 b ( )=- k 1+2k 2 +1 ( )x i and
Ui













 which implies that party c wins and
c







4k+3 1 ( ), i.e., party c chooses policy 1.
At t = 4k + 3 we have:
Ui
4 k+3 a ( ) = - k1 + 1 ( )xi - k2 1- xi ( ),Ui
4k+3 b ( )= - k1 + 2k2 +1 ( )xi  and
Ui













 which implies that party c wins and
c







4 k+4 1 ( ), i.e., party c chooses policy 1.
At t = 4 k +1 ( ) we have:
Ui
4 k +1 ( ) a ( ) = - k1 +1 ( )xi - k2 1- xi ( ),Ui
4 k+1 ( ) b ( ) = - k1 +1 ( )+ 2k2 ( )xi  and
Ui
4 k +1 ( ) c ( ) = - 2 k1 +1 ( )+ k2 ( ) 1- xi ( ).
Case 2.2.- If at t = 4k +1 party a chooses policy 1 then at t = 4k + 2 we have:
Ui
4 k+2 a ( ) =-k 1xi-k 2 k 2+1 ( )1-xi ( ),U i
4k+2 b ( )=- k 1+2k2+1 ( )xi and
Ui
4 k+2 c ( ) =- 2k 1+k 2 ( )1-xi ( ).
Therefore  a
4k+2 =
3k1k2 + k1 - 2k2 -1










that party c wins and  c







4k+3 1 ( ), i.e., party c chooses policy 1.
At t = 4k + 3 we have:
Ui
4 k+3 a ( ) = -k1xi - k2 k2 +1 ( ) 1- xi ( ),Ui
4k +3 b ( ) = - k1 + 2k2 +1 ( )xi and
Ui













 which implies that party b wins
and  b







4 k+4 1 ( ), i.e., party b chooses policy 0.
At t = 4 k +1 ( ) we have:
Ui
4 k +1 ( ) a ( ) = -k1xi - k2 + 1 ( ) 1- xi ( ),Ui
4 k+1 ( ) b ( ) = - k1 + 2 k2 +1 ( ) ( )xi  and
22Ui
4 k +1 ( ) c ( ) = - 2k1 + k2 + 1 ( ) ( ) 1- xi ( ).
Case 3.- Suppose that party c  wins the election. Then, using an argument symmetric to case 2 we
obtain the same results.
By combining the different cases we conclude that if a party mixes the two policies (because, given
that candidates are stagewise vote-maximizers, they are indifferent between 0 and 1), eventually it
will decide for one of them (candidates are no longer indifferent) and will continue choosing this
same policy forever. This result is represented in Figure 1. For k1 and k2 with values in region I,
party a maximizes the proportion of votes for next election by choosing policy 1. For k1 and k2
with values in region II, party a maximizes the proportion of votes for next election by choosing
policy 0. Party a is indifferent between policies 0 and 1 if k1 = k2 or k j = 0or1 for j =1or 2 .
Finally, for k1 and k2 with values outside of these regions, party a maximizes the proportion of
votes for next election by choosing policy 0 or 1 depending on the results of previous elections. In
all regions parties b and c maximize the proportion of votes for next election by choosing always
the same policy, 0 and 1 respectively.  Figure 1 also shows that, in any possible path, a party will
not switch between the two policies more than three times.
i ( ) follows directly from  ii ( ). Part II follows from part I.
Lemma 1: (i) If k0
a t ( )< k0
b t ( ) then k1
a t ( )³ k1
b t ( ).
(ii) If k0
a t ( )= k0
b t ( )  then  k1
a t ( )- k1
b t ( ) £1.
Proof: First we prove part (i). Suppose it is not true, i.e., at time t.we have k0
a t ( )< k0
b t ( ) and
k1
a t ( )< k1
b t ( ). Consider tb < t , the last time that party b won an election. Since tb < t  we must
have k0
a tb ( )£ k0
a t ( )  and k1
a tb ( )£ k1
a t ( ) . If at tb party b chose policy 0 then k0
b tb ( ) = k0
b t ( )-1
and k1
b tb ( ) = k1
b t ( ). Therefore k0
a tb ( )£ k0
b tb ( ) and k1
a tb ( ) < k1
b tb ( ) which implies that at tb party
b could not win. If at tb party b chose policy 1 then k0
b tb ( ) = k0
b t ( ) and k1
b tb ( ) = k1
b t ( )-1.
Therefore k0
a tb ( ) < k0
b tb ( ) and k1
a tb ( )£ k1
b tb ( ) which implies that at tb party b could not win.
Part (ii) follows from a similar argument.
Lemma 2: 
k








 for all p Î a,b,c { } and all t > 0.
Proof: Define X
t p,q ( )= xi Î 0,1 [ ]:Ui
t p ( ) = Ui
t q ( ) { } and let  x
t p,q ( )  be an element of  X
t p,q ( ).
To prove the Lemma we consider different cases depending on the values of k0
p t ( ) and k1
p t ( ) for
all  p (to simplify notation we will drop the time index). By the previous Lemma, it suffices to
study the following cases:
     

























































Suppose the contrary, i.e., 
k








 for some  p. Next we find a contradiction for each party
in each case:











c we have a contradiction.






c +1. It is
necessary that, given the performances of parties a and c, party b wins an election with either
k0
b -1 or k1
b -1. If party b chose policy 1 and case  i ( ) applies, we have
b = min x a,b ( ),x b,c ( ) { }. For party b to win we need x a,b ( ) ³
1
3
 for  k0
b,k1




b + 2 ³ k0
b + k1
b and contradicts the initial assumption. If party b
chose policy 0 and we have k0
b -1> k0
a then case  i ( ) applies and we have
b = min x a,b ( ),x b,c ( ) { }. For party b to win we need x a,b ( ) ³
1
3
 for  k0
b -1,k1






b contradicts the initial assumption. If party b chose policy 0
and we have k0
b -1= k0
a then case  iii ( )  applies and we have  b = x b,c ( ). For party b to win we
need x b,c ( )³
1
2
 for  k0
b -1,k1




b contradicts the initial
assumption.






b +1. Since in
this case party c is symmetric to party b the last argument applies here.
ii ( ) For parties a and b the contradiction follows directly.






b +1. It is
necessary that, given the performances of parties a and b, party c wins an election with either
k0
c - 1 or k1
c - 1. If party c chose policy 0 then case  ii ( ) applies and we have  c = 1- x a,c ( ).
For party c to win we must have k0
a = k0
b and 1- x a,c ( ) ³
1
3
 for  k0
c -1, k1




c + 2³ k0
c + k1
c contradicts the initial assumption. If party c chose policy 1 and we
have k1
c - 1> k1
a
 then case  ii ( ) applies and we have  c = 1- x a,c ( ). For party c to win we must
have k0
a = k0
b and 1- x a,c ( ) ³
1
3
 for  k0
c,k1
c -1 ( ). This condition 2k0
a + k1
a - k0
c + 1³ k0
c + k1
c
24contradicts the initial assumption. If party c chose policy 1 and we have k1
c - 1= k1
a by previous
lemmata this case is not possible.
iii ( )  For parties a and c the contradiction follows directly.






c +1. It is
necessary that, given the performances of parties a and c, party b wins an election with either
k0
b -1 or k1
b -1.. If party b chose policy 1 then case  iii ( )  applies and we have  b = x b,c ( ). For
party b to win we need x b,c ( )³
1
3
 for  k0
b,k1
b -1 ( ) .. This condition 2k1
c + k0
c - k1
b + 2 ³ k0
b + k1
b
contradicts the initial assumption. If party b chose policy 0 and we have k0
b -1> k0
a then case
iii ( )  applies and we have  b = x b,c ( ). For party b to win we need  x b,c ( )³
1
3
 for  k0
b -1,k1






b contradicts the initial assumption. If party b chose
policy 0 and we have k0
b -1= k0
a then case  v ( ) applies and we have  b = x b,c ( ). For party b to
win we need x b,c ( )³
1
2
 for  k0
b -1,k1






iv ( ) For parties a and b the contradiction follows directly.






b +1. It is
necessary that, given the performances of parties a and b, party c wins an election with either
k0
c - 1 or k1
c - 1. If party c chose policy 0 then case  iv ( ) applies and we have  c = 1- x a,c ( ).
For party c to win we need 1- x a,c ( ) ³
1
3
 for  k0
c -1, k1




c + 2³ k0
c + k1
c contradicts the initial assumption. If party c chose policy 1 and we
have k1
c - 1> k1
a
 then case  iv ( ) applies and we have  c = 1- x a,c ( ). For party c to win we need
1- x a,c ( ) ³
1
3
 for  k0
c,k1
c -1 ( ). This condition 2k0
a + k1
a - k0
c + 1³ k0
c + k1
c contradicts the initial
assumption. If party c chose policy 1 and we have k1
c - 1= k1
a then case  viii ( ) applies and we
have k0
c = k0
a -1. The contradiction follows directly.
For cases  v ( ) to  viii ( ) the contradiction follows directly.
Proof of Theorem 3:










 up to any permutation of parties. If  party a (or b) deviates  we will
have a situation as the one described in Theorem 2: one party mixes between policies 0 and 1 and
the other two parties always choose the same policy. In this case we have already seen that the
limit frequency of times in office of the party that mixes, in this case party a, is one fourth.
Therefore, parties a and b have no incentive to deviate. Now consider a deviation of party c.
Lemma 2 in the appendix proves that at each t > 0 an for all p Î a,b,c { },
k











p t ( )
t
  for any party is bounded by 
1
2
, for every strategies of its opponents.
Since in this case the limit frequency of party c is already one half, it does not have any incentive
to deviate.
Proof of Remark:
Suppose that the winners of the first three elections are a,b  and c respectively. Assume that
parties a and b are stagewise vote-maximizers. Suppose that parties a and b have chosen policy
0 the first time they took office (it is stagewise maximizing). Further, suppose that they choose the
following (stagewise maximizing) strategy for t > 2: if it is indifferent between the two policies in
terms of stagewise maximization then it will choose the policy that party c chose at t = 2 (the
third election). In this case we have that x
a ÎX
a  and  x
b ÎX
b
. Given the strategies of parties a
and b, it pays to party c not to maximize next election votes the first time it takes office (by
choosing policy 1) in order to make sure that its limit frequency of times in office will be one half.
If at t = 2 and t = 3 party c uses a stagewise maximizing strategy it will choose policy 1, since
parties a and b have chosen policy 0. At t = 4 there is a tie among the three parties. If parties a
(or b) wins this election it will be indifferent between policies 0 and 1 in terms of vote
maximization and it will choose policy 1 and from then on we will have the following result:
parties a and c choose always policy 1 and win one fourth of the times each and party b chooses
always policy 0 and wins one half of the times. If at t = 4 party c wins the election then at t = 5
party a (or b) will win and we will have the situation described above.
If at t = 2 party c chooses policy 0, instead of a vote maximizing policy, at t = 3 there is a tie
among the three parties. If party a (or b) wins the election it will be indifferent and will choose
policy 0, imitating party c at t = 2. If the next time that party c wins an election it chooses policy
1 then the result will be as follows: parties a and b choose always policy 0 and win one fourth of
the times each and party c chooses always policy 1 and wins one half of the times.
26